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Abstract
Maskin andTirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999.Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show
that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading
stage. Following their setup, I show that with asymmetric information at both stages, indescribability can matter.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There is now a vast literature on incomplete contracts (see
Tirole (1999) for a survey), which has successfully answered,
among other things, the meaning of ownership and the nature
and financial structure of the firm. In addressing these issues,
the literature has focused only on incomplete contracts in the
sense that even if the agents would like to add contingent
clauses, they are prevented from doing so because states are too
expensive to describe at the contracting stage. Maskin and
Tirole (1999) and Maskin (2002), however, show that
indescribability is not binding as a constraint in generating
contractual incompleteness. Their results rely on two assump-
tions always invoked by the literature: (1) there is symmetric
information both at the contracting stage and at the trading
stage and (2) agents can probabilistically forecast their possible
future payoffs.
The basic idea of Maskin and Tirole (1999) is given as
follows: if agents have trouble describing physical contingen-
cies, they can write contracts that ex ante specify only the
possible payoff contingencies. Then, later on, when the state of
the world is realized, they can fill in the physical details. It
follows that the only serious complication is incentive
compatibility: will it be in each agent's interest to specify
these details truthfully? But implementation theory with
symmetric information can be used to ensure that truthful
specification occurs in equilibrium. Here, indescribability is
simply considered a constraint that filling in the “physical”
details is impossible before the trading stage. Following Maskin
and Tirole's (1999) setup, I investigate under what conditions
indescribability matters. I propose asymmetric information at
the contracting stage as a reason why indescribability can
matter.1 When there is asymmetric information at the contract-
ing stage, indescribability can simply be a constraint that the
agents are unable to elicit their private information about
physical details of the states at the contracting stage and they
find it more costly to do so at the trading stage. With this in
mind, this paper's main result shows by a simple model that
there is a set of implementable contracts that always induce the
ex ante efficient trade when the states are describable, while
only the no-trade contract can be implemented when the states
are indescribable.
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2. Simple model
This paper will focus on a simple bilateral contracting
model.2
2.1. The underlying economy
Consider a bilateral contracting environment where a buyer
(B) and a seller (S) can trade one (but no more than one) of two
widgets indexed by S and r that the seller will produce and the
buyer will use to produce the final good.3 There are five dates in
this contractual relationship: At date 0, some partial information
about the state is revealed. At date 1, there is asymmetric
information in which the buyer and the seller can sign a
contract. At date 2, the buyer makes an unobservable
investment. At date 3, an additional information about the
state is realized. At date 4, the agents implement the trade
specified by the contract.
Let Ω={ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} be the set of states of the world.
The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller (in terms of
money) that they assign to widget k= S , r in state ω are denoted
vB
k (ω) and cS
k(ω), respectively, and suppose
v SB x1ð Þ ¼ v SB x3ð Þ ¼ 0; v SB x2ð Þ ¼ 15 and v SB x4ð Þ ¼ 0:
vrB x1ð Þ ¼ vrB x3ð Þ ¼ 0; vrB x2ð Þ ¼ 0 and vrB x4ð Þ ¼ 15:
c SS x1ð Þ ¼ c SS x3ð Þ ¼ 1; c SS x2ð Þ ¼ 10; and c SS x4ð Þ ¼ 10:
crS x1ð Þ ¼ crS x3ð Þ ¼ 1; crS x2ð Þ ¼ 10; and crS x4ð Þ ¼ 10:
2.2. Information structure
Each agent faces a different information structure, de-
pending on whether the contracting stage (date 2) or the
trading stage (date 4) is considered. Each agent's private
information about physical details of the states is given as a
partition of Ω.
Denote by Ψi
c a partition of Ω of agent i (i=B,S) at the
contracting stage, where ψi
c is a generic element ofΨi
c which is
agent i's type at the contracting stage. Similarly, denote by Ψi
t a
partition of Ω of agent i at the trading stage, where ψi
t is a
generic element of Ψi
t which is agent i's type at the trading
stage. Define Ψ c≡Ψ Bc ×Ψ Sc and Ψ t≡Ψ Bt ×Ψ St where ψc(ψt) is
a generic element of Ψ c(Ψ t).
The information structure at the contracting stage is
summarized below:
WcB ¼ x1;x2;x3;x4f g
WcS ¼ x1;x2f g; x3;x4f gf g:
At the contracting stage, the buyer is completely uninformed
of the state, while the seller knows exactly which widget should
be traded: widget S should be traded when the seller's type is
{ω1,ω2}, while widget r should be traded when the seller's type
is {ω3,ω4}.
4 The literature has instead assumed that no informa-
tion is revealed to anyone at the contracting stage, i.e.,Ψ B
c =Ψ S
c =
{ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}. This is called symmetric information at the
contracting stage. The information structure at the trading stage is
summarized as follows:
WtB ¼ x1;x2f g; x3;x4f gf g
WtS ¼ x1f g; x2f g; x3f g; x4f gf g:
At the trading stage, the seller is completely informed of the
state, while the buyer only knows either {ω1,ω2} or {ω3,ω4},
i.e., which widget should be traded.
2.3. Complete contracts
The set of feasible allocations Aω at state ω∈Ω is defined as
follows:
Ax ¼ Xx  Yx
where Xω and Yω will be defined momentarily. Xω is defined
as:
Xx ¼ xS xð Þ;xr xð Þð Þa 0;1f g2jxS xð Þ þ xr xð Þ ¼ 0 or 1
n o
where for each k=ℓ, r and each ω∈Ω, xk(ω)=0 stands for the
case where widget k is not produced at state ω and xk(ω)=1
stands for the case where widget k is produced and delivered to
the buyer at state ω. Furthermore, xℓ(ω)+xr(ω)=0 means that
no widget is produced at state ω and xℓ(ω)+xr(ω)=1 respects
the constraint that only one type of widgets can be produced and
traded at state ω. Yω is defined as:
Yx ¼ y xð Þaℝþf g
where y(ω) denotes the monetary transfer from the buyer to the
seller at state ω. Define Au [xaX Ax. A complete contract is a
function
n : XY A such that n xð ÞaAx8xaX:
Note that any complete contract is required to be
deterministic. This turns out to be a non-trivial restriction on
the set of complete contracts. With the set of notations provided
above, I can define each agent's state-dependent ex post utility
corresponding to a complete contract ξ(·)= (xℓ(·), xr(·), y(·))
such that for each ω∈Ω,
uB n xð Þ;xð Þ
¼
15 y xð Þ if either x ¼ x2 and xS x2ð Þ ¼ 1
or x ¼ x4 and xr x4ð Þ ¼ 1
y xð Þ otherwise
8><
>:
4 At the contracting stage, only the seller knows which widget should be
traded in this paper (asymmetric information), while both agents commonly
believe that each widget is equally likely to be the right widget in Hart and
Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) (symmetric information).
2 This paper's model is quite consistent with the general model of Kunimoto
(2006) and Maskin and Tirole (1999).
3 This environment is very similar to the one of Hart and Moore (1999) and
Segal (1999), although I do not discuss complexity of the environment at all.
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uS n xð Þ;xð Þ
¼
y xð Þ  10 if xS xð Þ þ xr xð Þ ¼ 1 and
either x ¼ x2 or x4
y xð Þ if xS xð Þ þ xr xð Þ ¼ 0
y xð Þ  1 otherwise
8>><
>>:
2.4. Investment
At date 0, Nature determines agents' type at the contracting
stage by the probability measure μ over Ψc with the following
property:
l x1;x2f gð Þ ¼ 1=2 and l x3;x4f gð Þ ¼ 1=2:
With private information at the contracting stage, only the
buyer makes an investment β in human capital which increases
the probability that the “right” widget entails high value. There
are only two levels of investment: either β=1 (investment) or
β=0 (no investment). The cost of investment c(β) (in terms of
money) is given as
c bð Þ ¼ 1 if b ¼ 1
0 if b ¼ 0:

It is a common knowledge that the likelihood and the way
these states of the world depend upon private information at the
contracting stage and the buyer's investment:
P x1j x1;x2f g;b ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ P x3j x3;x4f g;b ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1=3
P x2j x1;x2f g;b ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ P x4j x3;x4f g;b ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 2=3
P x1j x1;x2f g;b ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ P x3j x3;x4f g;b ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1=2
P x2j x1;x2f g;b ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ P x4j x3;x4f g;b ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1=2
Here I read “P(ω1|{ω1,ω2}, β=1)” as the likelihood that ω1 is
realized conditional upon the seller's type being {ω1,ω2} and the
buyer's positive investment. The above specification implies
that the buyer's investment is relationship-specific, in particular,
pays off only if the buyer receives the “right” widget. I say that
the pair (β⁎,ξ) is feasible if, given a complete contract ξ,
b4aargmax
b
X
wcaWc
l wcð Þ
X
xawc
P xjwc;bð ÞuB n xð Þ;xð Þ  c bð Þ:
Finally, the schematic diagram for the timing of the events is
summarized below:
3. Under what conditions does indescribability matter?
I will characterize a set of implementable complete contracts
as the one satisfying incentive compatibility (IC) and individual
rationality (IR) at the relevant timing, either at the contracting
stage or at the trading stage. A complete contract satisfies IC if,
for each agent, telling the truth is a best strategy provided that all
other tell the truth. A complete contract satisfies IR if, the
resulting expected utility of each agent is at least as the same as
the one corresponding to the no-trade outcome.
3.1. When Ω is indescribable at the contracting stage
When Ω is indescribable, agents are simply unable to elicit
information about Ψ c. At the trading stage in which Ω is
describable, however, agents are able to elicit information about
Ψ t. Thus, in this environment, I restrict attention to the set of
complete contracts which satisfy IC and IR at the trading stage.
Suppose that there is always trade. After ψt is realized,
efficiency consideration requires that the “right” widget be
traded in the “right” states: xℓ(ω2)=1 and xr(ω4)=1. Since the
seller perfectly identifies the underlying state, IR for the seller
implies that its price in states ω2 or ω4 must be at least 10. IC for
the seller immediately implies that it must be sold at the same
price in all states. However, any such complete contract ξwould
violate IR for the buyer which requires that, for any ω, y(ω)≤9
when β⁎=1 and y(ω)≤7.5 when β⁎=0. In either case, a
sequence of arguments then follows: (1) IR for the seller implies
that xk(ω)=0 for each k and ω=ω2, ω4; (2) IR for the buyer
implies that y(ω)=0 for any ω; and (3) IC for the seller implies
that xk(ω)=0 for any k and ω. In sum, the only complete
contracts satisfying IC and IR are the no-trade contract: xk(ω)=0
and y(ω)=0 for each k, ω. As a result, it is optimal for the buyer
to make no investment.
3.2. When Ω is describable at the contracting stage
The previous analysis already shows that if the agents elicit
information at the trading stage, only the no-trade contract can
be executed. When Ω is describable, however, the agents are
able to elicit information about Ψc at the contracting stage.
Therefore, I explore the possibility that the agents elicit
information only at the contracting stage, i.e., the set of complete
contracts satisfying IC and IR at the contracting stage.
Let ξ be a complete contract. Since ω1(ω3) is indistinguish-
able from ω2(ω3) at the contracting stage, I must have
n x1ð Þ ¼ n x2ð Þ and n x3ð Þ ¼ n x4ð Þ:
IC for the seller implies that the widget must be sold at the
same price. Thus, ξ has the following property:
y x1ð Þ ¼ y x3ð Þ ¼ y x2ð Þ ¼ y x4ð Þ:
Provided that there is always the ex ante efficient trade, for
any ω∈Ω, I let
n xð Þ ¼ xS xð Þ;xr xð Þ;y xð Þð Þ
¼ 1;0;yð Þ if x ¼ x1 or x2
1;0;yð Þ if x ¼ x3 or x4

ð1Þ
Suppose that the buyer's investment is β⁎=1. IR for the
seller implies that the expected cost of the widget is at least as
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great as 7. On the other hand, IR for the buyer implies that the
expected value of the widget is at most as great as 9. Hence, IR
for both agents can be summarized into the following condition
7 V y V 9: ð2Þ
Any complete contract ξ with Eqs. (1) and (2) satisfies IC
and IR at the contracting stage provided the buyer makes an
investment.5 Finally, I want to show that (β⁎,ξ)= (1,ξ) is
feasible. Define UB(ξ|β) to be the expected utility of the buyer at
the contracting stage corresponding to ξ given β. For any y≥0,
I have
UB njb ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 15 23 y 1 ¼ 9 y N7:5 y
¼ 15 1
2
 y ¼ UB njb ¼ 0ð Þ:
Thus, given ξ, it is optimal for the buyer to make an investment.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper asks the following question: “under what
conditions does indescribability matter?” Asymmetric informa-
tion at the contracting stage is the answer I promote in this
paper. In particular, I show by a simple model that there is a set
of implementable contracts that always induce the ex ante
efficient trade when the states are describable, while only the
no-trade contract can be implemented when the states are
indescribable. When there is asymmetric information at the
contracting stage, indescribability by itself significantly reduces
the set of implementable contracts.
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